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Abstract
Nonprofit charities and foundations hold endowments and other investments. How do
their investments perform? Some high-profile nonprofit endowments, importantly those of
colleges and universities, have been studied before. This study is the first, to our knowledge, that
looks at a large number of the diverse types of nonprofits. We investigate the determinants of
investment performance using a large panel data set culled from the 990 forms nonprofits must
file annually with the IRS. In this first part, we discuss our approach and the challenges of using
these data to infer investment returns. The IRS data, though less than perfect, yield valuable
measures of the investment returns of nonprofits. They reveal that some charities do consistently
better in their investment returns than do others.
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Nonprofit organizations, including public charities and private foundations, are granted
special tax-exempt status by the federal government to encourage their work promoting the
public interest. Nonprofits range widely in size, from small local organizations with no paid
employees to large nationwide organizations that employ thousands. Nonprofits also vary in the
ways they secure revenues. Those revenues have four major components: private donations,
government grants, program service revenue, and investment returns on financial assets.
We focus on investment returns, a source of revenue that is important for many
nonprofits, but hardly all. For the 100 public charities with the largest endowments, the median
ratio of endowment to expenditures was 7.50. A parallel calculation for those with the largest
levels of expenditure in 2007 gives a median ratio of only 0.755, just one tenth as high. This
disparity is to be expected, since the first selected on endowment size, and the second on
expenditure, but the salient lesson is that charities differ dramatically in their reliance on
endowments.
The largest endowments tend to belong to large private universities and private grantmaking foundations. The largest endowment among all charities in 2007 was $42 billion; the
20th largest was $7.84 billion. When an organization’s endowment is large, whether absolutely
or relative to its expenditures, its rate of investment return is critical. Fortunately, the largest
endowments, as has been suspected, appear to secure superior investment returns on a forwardlooking basis. This happy picture, however, fails to carry over to many other types of charitable
organizations, which on average achieve substantially lower investment returns for their
beneficiaries, their employees and their donors than should be possible. This analysis seeks to
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determine how well endowments perform. Its companion paper assesses the factors that affect
the financial performance of U.S. nonprofits' investments.
These papers are completed in spring 2013. Concerns with the financial meltdown of
2008-09 have receded, and both the stock and bond markets have recovered strongly. In the
meltdown period, press reports indicated that many nonprofit endowments suffered significantly,
including many that had been highly successful in the past. Nonsystematic data indicate that
some are still suffering in the aftermath. Unfortunately, our data source extends only through
2007, and data on nonprofit performance during the period starting with the 2008 financial
plunge is not yet available.
A number of papers investigate the investment performance and portfolio management
strategies of specific classes of nonprofits using survey data based on a subset of organizations of
a specific type. Higher education institutions – many blessed with large endowments -- have
received the most study. The National Association of College and University Business Officers
(NACUBO) and the Commonfund Institute annually release a Study of Endowments
documenting the performance of endowments of higher education institutions. The data for
these studies were obtained from surveys given to endowment managers; the fiscal year 2011
study included data from 823 institutions. The Commonfund Institute also releases annual
reports on investment performance for nonprofits in various categories, including healthcare,
private foundations, and operating charities. Its 2011 foundations report includes data from 175
institutions; its 2011 healthcare institutions report includes 90 nonprofit entities. These surveybased studies find similar patterns in investment performance: the nonprofits with the largest
endowments tended to get higher rates of return, and they also tended to invest a higher fraction
of their portfolio in alternative investments. 1
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Nonprofits are not subject to the same pressures on investment performance as are say
mutual funds or corporations. Customers or shareholders cannot exit after a poor investment
performance by selling their holdings. Karpoff and Rice (1989) examine the financial
performance of firms established under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of
1971. Although these firms were for-profit, the law prohibited their stock from being
traded. Their study found that these firms performed relatively poorly. This suggests that
nonprofit firms, also absent this pressure, may underperform as investors. 2
Other papers study the source of nonprofits’ endowments, as part of the burgeoning
literature on charitable contributions. For example, Ritchie and Eastwood (2006) examine how
the characteristics of the executives of nonprofits influence the magnitude and composition of
contributions.
This is the first analysis that studies investment performance of nonprofits broadly,
looking across institutions as diverse as colleges and universities, foundations, social service
organizations, and hospitals. It uses a large data set based on the IRS forms that public charities
and private foundations must submit annually. 3 While these forms, unlike financial reports filed
by some charities, do not explicitly state the organization's rate of return on financial assets, this
rate can be inferred from the reported data. Indeed, such inferred returns may be more reliable
than charities' self reports, which are surely computed inconsistently across charities, partly due
to temptations for creative calculation. Donors do not like to contribute to organizations that do
not invest their monies well. We employ several different ways to infer investment returns. As a
consistency check on our inferred returns, we compare the values we compute to investment
returns reported by major private universities on a Bloomberg survey to see how well they
match.
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Our data set has been widely used in studies of the nonprofit sector, but never to our
knowledge to analyze investment returns. 4 This data set offers many advantages. It covers a
broad range of nonprofits, including every nonprofit with $10 million or more in assets, as well
as a random sample of smaller nonprofits. Furthermore, it provides considerable additional
information about each nonprofit, enabling us to determine which factors promote better
investment performance.
Section 1 below briefly describes nonprofit organizations in the US and their investment
performance, as well as what past research has found relative to financial performance. Section
2 describes the data set used and provides some summary statistics. Section 3 details how the
data were used to construct the nonprofit-specific rate of return. It also compares calculations
here relative to those reported by some private universities. Section 4 concludes.
1. Nonprofit organizations and net assets
Nonprofit organizations are misleadingly named. For many such organizations revenues
notably exceed expenditures. The defining trait of nonprofits is not that they do not make what
many would describe as a profit. Rather, they face a non-distribution constraint: no party has a
residual claim on any net income. If reserves build up, there are no shareholders, and executives
are precluded from taking such income. In the United States, the provision of the tax code that
grants most nonprofits their status is 501(c). This section lists 27 types of nonprofit
organizations that are exempt from some federal income tax. 501(c)(3) organizations – by far
the largest and best known group -- include various charitable, religious, and educational
organizations. Other categories of nonprofits include labor unions (501(c)(5)), credit unions
(501(c)(14)), and the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (a single organization that
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gets its own code section: 501(c)(28)). All the organizations in our data qualify under the
501(c)(3) section.
These organizations are further divided by the IRS into two categories: "public charities"
and "private foundations." (This division is defined in section 509(a).) This distinction is
important for our analysis, since the two types of organizations file different IRS forms: public
charities file Form 990, and private foundations file Form 990PF. A public charity typically
receives a substantial fraction of its revenue from donors or grants and provides charitable
services. A private foundation typically has a single major source of funding and makes grants
to public charities for performing charitable work rather than directly performing such work
itself. 5 Notable public charities include the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army.
Significant private foundations include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford
Foundation. Public charities account for nearly 90% of all 501(c)(3) organizations. 6
When we use the terms "public charity" and "private foundation" (sometimes shortened
to just "charity" and "foundation"), we are utilizing the IRS's classification of these
organizations, i.e., whether they file a 990 or a 990PF. The name of an organization is irrelevant;
many public charities have the word "foundation" in their name. More importantly, many public
charities act largely like foundations, making grants to other organizations. Notably, United
Way chapters are classified as charities, not foundations. These organizations are sometimes
referred to as "public charity foundations" or "community foundations." Because they file the
Form 990, they are classified here as charities.
Before considering investment performance, a logical fundamental question to ask is why
nonprofits hold any endowment at all. Fisman and Hubbard (2003, 2005) provide an answer.
They focus on production smoothing or precautionary savings, namely that endowment funds are
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used to smooth the variability in other sources of funding, providing a relatively stable level of
charitable services. They find evidence consistent with endowments being used as a
precautionary savings device (2003) and find that the propensity to use funds in this way is
curtailed in states with poor government oversight (2005). They interpret the last result as
suggesting that nonprofit managers possibly use funds improperly for personal reasons. 7 Helms
and others (2005) note that higher education endowments serve the same purpose of
precautionary savings, and they study how donor restrictions affect institutions' abilities to
manage their endowment.
Precautionary savings, however, cannot account for a salient feature of nonprofit
behavior. Of those with a major endowment, only a minority of them draws down their assets in
a year, leaving aside the unusual years when investment returns are strongly negative. Of the
nonprofits in our sample (data are described below) with over $10 million in net assets at the
beginning of tax year 1987, a relatively "flat" year in which the S&P 500 stock index (including
dividends) rose 5.3%, fewer than 20% ended that tax year with the value of their net assets
reduced. The median growth in the endowments that year was 6.9%. In 2000, when the S&P
fell by 9.1%, only 40% of nonprofits in our sample with over $10 million in net assets at the
beginning of the year ended the year with their net assets reduced; the median endowment
growth rate was 3.1%.

In 2007, when the S&P 500 rose by 5.5%, about 37% of nonprofits in

our sample with over $10 million in net assets at the beginning of the year ended the year with
their net assets reduced, and the median endowment growth rate was 2.9%. (Unfortunately, our
data only extend through 2007, before the financial crisis.)
Looking across all the years in our data, it seems clear that many charities consider
building their endowment to be a critical end unto itself. Foundations produce even more
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Midas-like behavior. Foundations are penalized financially by the government if they do not
expend at least 5% of their assets in a period. This turns out to be a near binding constraint,
though in most years most foundations earned far more than 5%. 8
Nonprofit executives, like any executives, are agents for other parties. An intriguing
question is: who is the principal for whom these executives serve as agents? Is it the board, the
recipients of charitable services, or some ill-defined future entity? Core and others (2006)
examine the factors that lead endowment holdings to be excessive. They measure a nonprofit's
excess endowment as being the residual from an estimated regression model of endowments on
firm characteristics, and they look for correlations between this excess endowment and other
firm characteristics. 9 Gentry (2002) examines endowment holdings of nonprofit hospitals, which
are allowed to issue tax-exempt bonds. He finds that hospitals, as we would expect, engage in
tax arbitrage by having these bonds issued instead of spending funds from their endowment. As
much as $32.6 billion of the $55.9 billion total tax-exempt liabilities of hospitals in 1996 could
have been eliminated had hospitals used their endowments rather than issuing debt. 10
The role of endowments for universities is much discussed. According to data from the
NACUBO Endowment Study, in 2011, the ten largest university endowments held from $7.0
billion to $31.7 billion.11 The average percentage increase of these ten endowments over the
prior year was 19.0%, compared to the S&P 500 gain of 28.5%. By contrast, before the collapse
of financial markets and subsequent recession, university endowments tended to dramatically
outperform market indices. The average percentage increase from 2006 to 2007 on the ten
largest university endowments was 21.3%, compared to the S&P 500 gain of 21.6%. In the
following fiscal year, they had an average percentage increase of 3.4% compared to the S&P 500
decrease of 13.12%. The ten largest university endowments as of June 2002 grew an average of
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84.3% by June 2008, while the S&P 500 grew by 46% over that period. These growth
percentages are not the rates of return on investments, since they include the net change in
donations and expenses plus investment income. However, it seems unlikely that the needs of
these universities grew by 84.3% over six years. The best explanation is that endowment size
itself is an important component of status or performance. To illustrate, many people know that
Harvard has the largest endowment among universities. Few can name three distinguished
professors there.
Considering only the self-reported rates of investment return, as of June 2011, the tenyear average annualized rate of return for college endowments larger than $1 billion was 6.9%,
whereas for those with less than $25 million it was 4.9%. 12 These rates of return were achieved
during a period where the S&P 500 price index earned merely a 0.76% per-year gain. (All of
these endowments held some bonds, which paid less than stocks over this period.) The 7% rate
of excess return for the largest endowments is impressive, dramatically above what most top
equity managers can claim. This provides suggestive evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. But of
course we would expect that the larger endowments were the ones that had grown most swiftly,
just as we would if looking at heights of 16-year-old boys. Thus, a more statistically justified
assessment would look at the 10 largest college endowments at some specified date and ask how
they did over the next decade. Our specialized data set on university and college endowments
does not provide this figure, but we examine this effect of size on a forward looking basis in our
regression results in part two (see Table 3).
Hansmann (1990) poses the question "why do universities have endowments?" He
concludes that their large endowments are difficult to rationalize from standard economic
models. He considers several potential explanations, including intergenerational equity,
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smoothing over lumpy income streams, the tax incentives of potential donors, the need for
maintaining liquidity in the presence of income shocks, the preferences of donors or
administrators, and the fact that universities have become accustomed to large endowments and
have formed a building habit (though he does not provide a definitive answer to his question).
Brown (1999) examines the investment strategy and performance of university endowments and
finds considerable variation among endowments in both investment strategy and performance.
The average endowment outperformed the market after adjusting for risk. However, the
observed risk level is lower than expected. Lerner and others (2007) analyze the investment
behavior and performance of institutional investors, of which endowments are but one small
component. Looking over a period when institutional investors made significant gains, they find
that endowments achieve investment returns that are 121% of the average for such investors.
They infer that endowment managers are taking advantage of information they garner as inside
investors to improve returns, and do this better than the average institutional investor.
Agency considerations also provide a somewhat different argument as to why college and
other endowments are large and spending is constrained to enable them to grow on average.
College presidents and many other leaders of nonprofits have fundraising as a major
responsibility. Fundraising success is more convincingly and visibly demonstrated by a large
and growing endowment than merely by large annual figures for donations. Thus, big
endowments serve to signal administrator success, and as a readily visible scorecard they become
an end in and of themselves. 13 We focus not just on universities but on all charities. Our goal is
to understand how effectively they invest, not to explain why so many of them have such large
endowments. Alas, other researchers have not provided a satisfactory explanation of the largeendowment phenomenon. But whatever the explanation(s), it seems clear that it is highly
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desirable for an organization – or at least those in charge of the organization -- to have its
endowment grow rapidly.
High investment returns would be a very welcome contributor to such growth, and that is
the subject of our analysis. Moreover, even for a charity that wished to maintain a constant
endowment size, or constant size relative to expenditures, greater returns would be welcome,
since they would afford a higher level of expenditure.
2. Data
We use data collected by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the
Urban Institute. These data come from the IRS forms 990 (for public charities) and 990PF (for
private foundations) that nonprofits are required to file annually. We use data from 1982 through
2007, excluding 1984, when they were not collected. Unfortunately, this data set does not
stretch beyond 2007, and thus misses the financial tsunami of 2008. Each charity in the data set
is categorized according to the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE). Among the
major groups are Arts, Culture and Humanities (A), Environment (C), Health Care (E), Medical
Research (H), and Human Services (P). An online appendix describes the data in more detail. 14
Our measure of the size of the organization's endowment is its reported net assets, or fund
balances. While we will refer to this value as the organization's "endowment," it is important to
note that it is not measuring an organization's endowment as conventionally understood. Net
assets should include fully-funded endowments funds, but organizations may use these funds to
informally finance loans, in which case the endowment may not be fully represented in net
assets. Endowments are not separately reported in the Form 990. 15 Nevertheless, we argue that
net assets are the best measure that we have available for an organization's size.
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Bowman et. al. (2012) analyze surpluses and endowments for public charities using 990
data. They argue that, although the 990 does not provide data on endowments, a pro forma
definition of a charity's endowment can be created from the 990 data by summing the reported
investments in securities and "other investments." As discussed in the appendix, two of our three
measures of an organization's rate of return use these reported investments, while the third uses
reported net assets.
Summary statistics from the entire sample are presented in Table 1, which reports the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of certain variables, along with their means. All values are inflated
or deflated by the CPI to 2007 dollars. The first two rows provide the beginning-of and end-ofyear values for the net assets, or fund balances, listed by the organization. 16 This is the sum of
total assets minus total liabilities as reported on the nonprofit's balance sheet. The median value
of net assets is $10.2 million for nonprofits in this sample. The mean value, not surprisingly, is
more than four times as high, illustrating the skew in endowment sizes. For all variables, the
mean is much larger than the median and even larger than the 75th percentile, implying
considerable skewness.
Our prime interest is investment returns. The next four rows represent four mutually
exclusive categories of investment income: interest, dividends, other investment income (a small
component of total income and one not present for most organizations and not asked of
foundations) and net revenue from sale of assets (realized capital gains). This last category
varies greatly across organizations. It has a higher mean value but a lower median value than
either interest or dividends. Comparing the four types of investment income to the statistics for
total income, in the following row, it can be seen that for most nonprofits these are modest
sources of investment income. 17
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The next three rows present statistics on expenses. Management and general expenses is
a category that includes payments for overall function and management. It includes the salaries
and expenses of the organization's chief officer, expenses for board meetings, legal services, and
office management, among others. It explicitly does not include either the direct conduct of
program services or fundraising, both of which are tallied separately. Importantly for our
purposes, it also includes investment expenses, which may be associated with investment returns.
Unfortunately, investment expenses are not reported separately from the rest of management and
general expenses. The median value for management and general expenses is about $394,000.
On average, management and general expenses represent about 10% of total expenses.

The

ratio of management and general expenses to total expenses tends to be somewhat larger for
smaller organizations than for larger organizations, where size is measured by total expenses.
The median value of the ratio for the lowest total expenditure decile is 0.21, and the median
value for the highest expenditure decile is 0.11. Fundraising expenses (available only for public
charities, not private foundations) are much smaller than management and general expenses.
The majority of charities report zero fundraising expenses.
The next two rows are taken from the balance sheets of the Form 990s and Form 990PFs.
Savings includes the sum of all interest bearing checking accounts, savings, and temporary cash
investments. Investment securities include both publicly traded and non-publicly traded
securities. The median and mean for securities is higher than that for savings. The last row
represents the total compensation of officers, directors, trustees, and key employees. 18 The
median value for this variable is below $10,000 while the mean is over $250,000, indicating the
skewness in the size of charities.
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For some nonprofits, total annual operating expenditures are tiny relative to a vast
endowment, whereas for others the endowment is a small value compared to how much they
spend in a year. Figure 1 considers how the ratio of the endowment to total expenses varies for
nonprofits of different size. Nonprofits are grouped into ten deciles according to their total
incomes in 2007 dollars. Within each group, the height of the bar is the median value of the ratio
of net assets to total expenses. As size increases (where size is measured by total income), this
ratio decreases, as we would expect given that selection is on income. 19
Figure 2 plots the same statistic: the ratio of net assets to expenses, but divides all
organizations into deciles by size of net assets, that is, beginning-of-year fund balances. Here,
the net asset/expense ratio roughly increases with nonprofit size up to the 6th decile, and then
declines. This is a surprising result: A rise throughout would be expected if some nonprofits
simply wanted to spend more than others (their net assets and their ratio would be lower), or if
some nonprofits were more fortunate on investment performance (their net assets and ratios
would be higher). 20 The decline beyond the 6th decile may be because large organizations' net
assets are disproportionately composed of property, plant, and equipment and as such are not
correlated with expenses. Substantial fixed assets likely characterize both hospitals and
universities, categories of nonprofits that tend to have large endowments.
3. Measuring rates of return on investments and comparing with universities' reported
rates of return
Forms 990 and 990PF do not ask for the rate of return on the filing nonprofit's investment
portfolio. However, that is the prime quantity that we seek. Some nonprofits disclose their rate
of return in a financial report, but we know of no source that collects the data from these reports.
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Even if such reports were collected, a consistent methodology has significant advantages over
self reports, given the potential for creative accounting and definition of variables.
To meet our objective, we create measures of the rate of return using the information in
the 990 forms. To get a sense of how good these created measures are, we compare our
calculated values with those reported by the nation's largest universities (by endowment size),
since investment returns for this particular class of nonprofits are announced and regularly
collected. The calculations of our three measures of the rate of return, labeled ror1, ror2, and
ror3, are described in detail in an online appendix. Notably, only the first measure (ror1) uses
reported net assets in its calculation; ror2 and ror3 use only investment assets reported on
balance sheets. 21
Summary statistics for the three definitions of rate of return are presented in Table 2. The
first row presents the number of observations, and then the 25th percentile, median, 75th
percentile, and mean values for ror1. The median rate of return is 4.74%, with an interquartile
range of [1.07%, 10.5%]. However, the mean value is 219%. The mean value is so large
because a small number of the calculated rates of return are very large and swamp the average
calculation. In fact, the largest value is over 200,000%, which is clearly in error due to mistakes
in the numbers on the federal forms. Our concern is not with obvious errors due to extreme
outliers, but with the reliability of the data in general. Our calculated rates are vulnerable to
inaccuracies in reported data values. Charities may not accurately record their net assets, may
not use consistent accounting methods at the beginning and end of the year, or may simply make
clerical errors. 22 Beyond the concerns of errors and inconsistencies, our assumption about when
expenses and revenues occur may give us values that are slightly off base.
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We deal with the errors problem by trimming extreme values. Let sp_ret be the return on
the S&P 500 index in a particular year, in percent. The final column in row 1 shows the fraction
of observations that lie within the range [–50% + sp_ret, 50% + sp_ret]. Fewer than 6% of
observations fall outside of this range. Those observations that perform either extremely well or
extremely poorly compared to that year's average market performance according to our
calculations are likely to be giving us erroneous values. The following row recalculates the
summary statistics omitting the small fraction of observations lying outside that range. While
the median and quartile values do not change much, the mean is quite a bit smaller and provides
a more reasonable value. 23 In the regression results below, we will only use the observations
that fall within this range. Regressions that include these extreme outliers are inconsistent.
The summary statistics for ror2 are systematically higher than those for ror1 by around
one percentage point. As before, a small fraction of observations throw off the mean value of the
rate of return. If we omit rate of return values less than 50% + sp_ret, or greater than –50% +
sp_ret, the mean as well as the quartiles values are much more in line with the previous
calculations. On the other hand, ror3 seems to be significantly higher than the other values.
This is likely due to the substitution of "other changes in net assets" for unrealized capital gains
(as described in the appendix). For most charities these values are identical, but for some they
differ, and these differences lead to a systematic overestimate of the rate of return. We thus
proceed with caution when using ror3, but remain reasonably confident about the reliability of
the other two measures of the rate of return. 24
Though the measures reflect internal consistency with each other, we also seek an
external measure of validation. We can do this for the sample of the largest universities in the
country. The rate of return on their endowments is widely reported. We use the reported rates of
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return from a 2005 Bloomberg survey of the 25 largest higher-education endowments. 25 We
compare these reported rates of return with the four definitions of rate of return generated from
our data. We also compare the university's endowment size, as reported in the National
Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) Endowment Study, with
the value of net assets reported in the 990. While the Bloomberg survey includes 25 universities,
the 990 forms are only filed for non-governmental nonprofits, so the five public universities on
the list (Texas, California, Texas A&M, Michigan, Virginia) are omitted from our analysis. 26
Table 3 presents these comparisons. The first two columns list the endowment size at the
end and beginning of fiscal year 2004, as reported in the NACUBO survey. The next two
columns are the values listed on the Form 990 for net assets or fund balances at the beginning
and end of the year. The bottom of the table displays the correlation coefficient between the
corresponding values from the NACUBO survey and the Form 990 for the beginning and end of
the year. The first fact to note is that the NACUBO survey values are high. Indeed, for 15 out of
20 universities, the return reported to Bloomberg exceeds the three other calculated returns.
Presumably, this indicates that universities are conducting their calculation for Bloomberg, and
presumably other areas of public consumption, in the manner that puts their performance in the
most favorable light. 27 It is reassuring that the correlation coefficients between the fund balances
reported in the NACUBO survey and those reported on the Form 990 are quite high; both are
over 99%.
There is a significant bias in the columns from the 990. In every case the fund balance
listed in the 990 is higher than the endowment value as reported in the survey. As mentioned
earlier, this is because our measure of net assets from the 990 form is not identical to a
university's endowment. A university's net assets as listed on the 990 include the endowment as
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well as funds in the general operating account. Funds in an operating account can also be
invested and thereby earn investment income, but they are typically managed separately from the
funds in the endowment. To the extent that we are interested in a nonprofit's overall investment
performance, we should want to consider the return on the entire fund balance, including the
endowment, the general operating account, and other funds. But to the extent that we want to
compare our calculated rates of return to the ones in the survey, we should focus solely on the
endowment. Unfortunately, the 990 does not separately list endowment funds and endowment
investment income. 28
The next column lists the rate of return on the endowment, as reported in the Bloomberg
survey. These rates of return are quite high compared to the summary statistics in Table 2.
Taking the Bloomberg results as gospel and comparing the returns it reports to average annual
rates of return on securities, universities tended to do well in their investments over the period of
study. 29 The last three columns then present rates of return as calculated by the information in
the 990s and described above. The values in all three columns are usually lower than the self
reported rates of return on the endowment. There are two explanations for this pattern: First,
including all funds, and not just the endowment, injects a downward bias into the calculation.
Operating funds are appropriately invested in short-term, liquid securities, hence in expectation
earn significantly less than the endowment. 30 Again, we have no way to measure the return on
just the endowment from the 990s. However, the correlation coefficients show that, for ror1 and
ror3, the calculated values of the rate of return are strongly positively correlated with the
reported values. This correlation is not quite as high for ror2. Second, universities are surely
exercising some flexibility in the way they report results to Bloomberg, and presumably take
advantage by selecting a method that makes their returns look high. No doubt, some universities
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take more advantage than others, which diminishes the correlations between our calculated
returns and those reported to Bloomberg.
In summary, the results from these largest private universities suggest that our calculated
rates of return provide a good indication of the relative investment performance of this class of
nonprofits using any of a variety of measures. Absolute performance numbers will, of course,
depend on which computational conventions one employs. The calculated values for both the
rate of return and the fund balances do not fully align, but we did not expect them to, since we
cannot separate the endowment from other funds, which can be a significant portion of the total.
Whatever combination of funds is invested, our primary concern is with the overall investment
performance of the nonprofits, not just of their endowments. Obviously, the smaller is an
organization’s endowment relative to other financial quantities (such as operating budget), the
more important it is to include returns on all funds. 31
Do some charities perform consistently better than others? To answer this question, we
conduct a simple analysis. For each charity, we take the arithmetic mean of the calculated rate of
return (here using ror1) in all odd-numbered years, and the arithmetic mean in all evennumbered years, and evaluate the correlation coefficient between these two values over all
charities. It would be surprising if this correlation were not high because some organizations
invest more effectively than others, focus more attention on securing high returns, etc. 32
As before, we drop outliers, those whose average rates of return as calculated end up
higher than 50% or less than –50% plus the average growth rate in the S&P 500 for those years.
This drops 11% of the charities. The correlation coefficient between average returns in oddnumbered years and average returns in even-numbered years is a robust 0.305. 33 This is
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The significance remains even after
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controlling for the age and endowment size of the organization. The key finding is that some
nonprofits invest much more effectively than do others. 1
Some classes of charities, such as universities, may be much more focused on their
endowments than others, in part because their endowments are more significant relative to other
financial quantities. Thus we repeat this exercise looking within charity type for the 26
alphabetic charity categories. 25 out of 26 categories of charity show correlation coefficients
that are significantly positive. 34 For these 25, the correlation coefficients range from a high of
0.6299 for Mutual and Membership Benefits charities to a low of 0.098 for Philanthropy,
Voluntarism and Grantmaking foundations. Thus, among each charity type, some entities invest
better than others.
4. Conclusion
We investigated the investment returns that are earned by nonprofit organizations in the
United States. These returns can be very large relative to the organization’s operating budget.
This income supports public purposes, and as such is generally tax-exempt. These factors make
this income a public policy concern. 35 Yet little is known about whether nonprofits invest
effectively, and what characteristics of nonprofits lead them to earn higher returns. Data from
annual IRS 990 forms, which are required and available for nearly all nonprofits, enable us to
infer a nonprofit's rate of return on its investments. A comparison of our calculated rates of
returns to rates or return reported by a subset of organizations (universities) demonstrates that
our measures, despite imperfections, are informative. The data show that some charities invest
more effectively than others. Part 2 of this study describes our hypotheses about what types of

1

Our measure of investment performance is an organization's rate of return. In the regression results presented in
Part II, we will control for risk by including the standard deviation of an organization’s rate of return.
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organizations can be expected to earn higher returns, and presents empirical results testing those
hypotheses.
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Note: The groups in the x-axis are the deciles of the distribution of total incomes. Data are from
1982-2007.
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Figure 2
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Note: The groups in the x-axis are the deciles of the distribution of total beginning-of-year
endowment. Data are from 1982-2007
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Table 1

Summary Statistics
p25

p50

p75

mean

Net assets, beginning-of-year

1357179

1.02E+07

3.46E+07

5.50E+07

Net assets, end-of-year

1632967

1.16E+07

3.78E+07

6.01E+07

Interest income

0

13232.02

169533.2

458750.8

Dividend income

0

44547.74

594684

1472545

Other investment income*

0

0

0

346130.3

Net revenue from sale of assets

0

0

278156.9

2151130

Total income

777147.5

5216385

2.53E+07

4.48E+07

Management and general expenses

42125.33

394316.8

2598748

5073791

Fundraising expenses*

0

0

162280.4

436256.2

Total expenses

605152.3

3764837

2.15E+07

4.03E+07

Savings, end-of-year†

33.80576

350057.2

2585390

5715655

Investment securities, end-of-year†

0

951824.3

1.33E+07

3.60E+07

Compensation of officers and directors 0

9533.806

214685.4

296200.6

Note: Data are from 1982-2007 SOI files. All statistics are from all 394,964 observations, except for those marked
with an asterisk (*), which are only available for the 291,338 observations of charities, and those marked with a
dagger (†), unavailable in the 1998 file and only available for the remaining 381,294 observations. All values are
deflated by the CPI to 2007 dollars.
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Table 2

Rate of Return Summary Statistics
Percentage ∈
[–50% +
sp_ret, 50% +
N

p25

p50

p75

Mean

sp_ret ]

ror1

347798

1.07%

4.74%

10.5

219%

94.1%

ror1 | ror1 ∈

327305

0.97%

4.39%

9.30%

5.99%

ror2

64877

1.62%

5.91%

13.3%

38500%

ror2 | ror2 ∈

60191

1.47%

5.40%

11.4%

7.34%

ror3

200528

2.84%

7.75%

15.3%

104700%

ror3 | ror3 ∈

183104

2.87%

7.34%

13.4%

8.94%

[–50% +
sp_ret, 50% +
sp_ret ]
92.8%

[–50% +
sp_ret, 50% +
sp_ret ]
91.3%

[–50% +
sp_ret, 50% +
sp_ret ]
Note: Data are from 1982-2007 SOI files. The definitions of rate of return (ror1, ror2, ror3) are given in the text.
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Table 3

Comparison of Calculated and Reported Rates of Return
Endowment

Fund Bal

Endowment (000s)

Fund Bal

(000s)

Rate of

(000s) End

Beginning

(000s) End

Beginning of

Return FY

of FY 2004

of FY 2004

of FY 2004 FY 2004 -

2004 -

- NACUBO

- NACUBO

- 990

Bloomberg

Harvard University

22143649

18849491

26924708

23107711

21.10%

19.80%

11.65% 21.70%

Yale University

12747150

11034600

13747084

12027930

19.40%

18.99%

19.83% 19.84%

Stanford University

9922000

8614000

13080612

11551151

18.00%

14.22%

16.27% 15.90%

Princeton University

9928200

8730100

10427330

9376207

16.50%

14.48%

15.82% 15.82%

MIT

5865212

5133613

7760024

6953253

18.10%

13.74%

15.32% 15.32%

Columbia University

4493085

4343151

6168916

5977224

16.90%

5.81%

13.03%

University of Pennsylvania

4018660

3547473

5568519

5071427

16.90%

9.80%

13.21% 12.94%

Washington Univ.

4000823

3470072

5362749

4728606

18.20%

13.95%

18.89% 18.97%

Emory University

4535587

4019766

5155385

4872177

14.60%

8.66%

10.22% 10.05%

Northwestern University

3668405

3051167

4720140

4238724

19.20%

13.00%

16.06% 16.06%

University of Notre Dame

3095703

2573346

4046685

3436922

20.30%

18.90%

21.27% 22.20%

Institution

990

ror1

ror2

ror3

7.38%
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University of Chicago

3620728

3221851

4188840

3735249

16.60%

15.50%

16.64% 18.72%

Cornell University

3238350

2854771

5480422

5002938

16.10%

11.47%

15.34% 15.67%

Duke University

3313859

3017261

5082822

4471507

18.00%

14.00%

20.02% 21.51%

Rice University

3302455

2937649

3769197

3389700

17.20%

15.22%

16.86% 16.89%

Dartmouth College

2454293

2121183

3076295

2689220

18.60%

15.76%

16.43% 16.43%

Vanderbilt University

2296262

2019139

3559376

3134584

16.90%

13.03%

15.26% 16.00%

California

2399960

2113666

3565987

3174724

16.90%

10.01%

14.46% 13.10%

Johns Hopkins University

2055542

1714541

3207943

2974771

15.30%

8.83%

12.75% 12.82%

Brown University

1647295

1461327

2200244

1918913

16.30%

13.23%

16.23% 16.23%

0.9914

0.9909

Univ. of Southern

Correlation of 990 data with reported
survey data

0.7601

0.4581

0.6939

Note: Reported endowments are from the 2004 NACUBO Endowment Study. Reported rates of return are from the 2005 Bloomberg survey of higher education
endowments. All other values are generated from data in the 2003 SOI files (for the fiscal year running from July 2003 to June 2004). Definitions of rate or
return are given in the text.
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Endnotes
1

Although we do not use the NACUBO or Commonfund data in our paper, a number of papers

have used them to study aspects of endowment performance. Dimmock (2012) finds that
universities with higher background risk invest more heavily in fixed income and less in
alternatives. Larger universities hold more risky assets than smaller universities. Brown et. al.
(2010) find that while asset allocation differs across endowments, in the cross section it is
unrelated to returns. Lerner et. al. (2008) find that endowment size, student quality, and the use
of alternative investments are all positively correlated with high returns.
2

Fama and Jensen (1985) provide a theoretical analysis of investment strategies for different

types of firms, including nonprofits. They note that there are no residual claimants on the
investment returns from nonprofits. They indicate, however, that given the consideration of
future contributions, donors may in effect substitute for residual claimants, and that donor
preferences will influence investment decisions. Though their principal focus is on direct
capital investments, their analysis extends to – and they mention – nonprofit endowments.
3

Our data section describes the minor class of exceptions.

4

Bowman et. al. (2012) use the same data source to study nonprofit surplus (the analogue of

profit).
5

The IRS summarizes the distinction between the two types of organizations here:

http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Life-Cycle-of-a-PublicCharity-Private-Foundation.
6

Our data set over-represents large organizations. Therefore foundations, which are on average

larger than charities, are over-represented in our data set.
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7

They note, however, that there is a conflict between this need for precautionary savings and an

agency problem created by giving managers control over the endowment. They look at nonprofit
endowment data for correlations between endowment size and measures of government
oversight, hypothesizing that there will be lower endowments where there is more oversight, due
to less agency problems. They find no such correlation, however.
8

Satchell and Thorp (2007) determine the optimal dynamic consumption paths for charitable

endowments, as a function of an organization's preferences over risk and intertemporal
substitution. Bowman (2011) presents a model of a nonprofit’s optimal financial decisions
taking into account capacity and sustainability.
9

They find support for agency problems (a nonprofit manager may increase the organization's

endowment beyond the optimal level and use excess funds for personal gain), consistent with
Fisman and Hubbard (2005).
10

Black (1980) considers tax arbitrage within pension funds run by for-profit firms. Fraser and

Jennings (2006) use a behavioral asset allocation model to argue that foundations and
endowments are excessively conservative. Bowman (2002) studies the debt-issuing decisions of
nonprofits.
11

Select tables from this study are available publicly at:

http://www.nacubo.org/Research/NACUBO_Endowment_Study/Public_NCSE_Tables_.html.
12

The size of university endowments is creating controversy, as some legislators are calling for

reevaluation of some schools' nonprofit status in the presence of these large holdings. A group
of Harvard University alumni have formed and organization, Harvard Alumni for Social Action,
that prods the university to use some of its $35 billion endowment towards more direct charitable
work. A Massachusetts state representative has proposed a bill that would tax any university
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endowments over $1 billion at a 2.5% rate. Some federal legislators have suggested requiring
universities to spend at least 5% of their endowments annually, as private foundations are
required to (universities are classified as public charities and hence are not required to meet the
5% distribution rule). In September 2008 the Senate Finance Committee chaired a roundtable
discussion of this issue. This is not the first time such a rule has been proposed. The Filer
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, which issued a far-reaching and detailed
report on the nonprofit sector in 1977, recommended that all nonprofits, including universities,
be subject to the 5% rule.
13

On signaling, see Spence (2002); on principal-agent problems, which provide the need for

signaling, see Pratt and Zeckhauser (1985).
14

The online appendix is available here:

http://www.uncg.edu/bae/people/heutel/Papers/OnlineAppendix_HZ.pdf.
15

Both Form 990 and Form 990PF ask each organization for its "permanently restricted" net

assets, but this variable is not coded into our data set.
16

While the Form 990 lists this value as "net assets or fund balances," we will also alternately

refer to these holdings as the nonprofit's "endowment." Some nonprofits, notably universities,
maintain an endowment that is only a part of their total fund balances; see the discussion in the
following section.
17

Unrealized capital gains represent a fifth and major component of investment returns. Such

gains are not reported directly on the revenue section of the 990. They are reported in a
subsequent section throughout the sample period, but this variable is only coded into the data for
later years in the sample, presenting a challenge that we discuss below.
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18

A "key employee" is defined as "any person having responsibilities, powers, or influence

similar to those of officers, directors, or trustees."
19

This same pattern holds when organizations are categorized by expenses rather than income.

20

Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxen rank-sum tests show that the ratios in decile 6 are significantly

greater than they are in any other decile , and that the ratios in decile 7 are significantly greater
than those for all but decile 6.
21

These measures are thus more comparable to the pro forma endowment measures suggested by

Bowman et. al. (2012).
22

Froelich et. al. (2000) study the adequacy and reliability of data from the Form 990. They

fund that the data from the most basic categories of revenues, expenses, and net assets are
consistent with more detailed audit information.
23

We experimented with different values for the boundaries of exclusion, being more

conservative ([–25%+ sp_ret, 25% + sp_ret]) and more liberal ([–100% + sp_ret, 100% +
sp_ret]). Reducing the values for the bounds clearly increases the percentage of observations
that we have to omit. It also has a small effect on the mean values of rates of return; the more
observations that we include the higher is our calculated mean. However, the regression results
presented below are fairly robust to different definitions of these bounds. We also look for
something that characterizes charities with rates of return outside of these bounds by running a
regression where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the calculated rate of return is
outside of [–50%+ sp_ret, 50% + sp_ret]. Larger charities (measured by beginning-of-year net
assets) are less likely to have excluded rates of return (though simply eliminating all observations
with beginning-of-year net assets less than $1 million or $10 million does not substantively
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reduce the fraction of observations with excluded rates of return). There are also some
significant coefficients on charity type and year.
24

Note the appropriate calculation of investment rates of return does not depend on when

investment returns, say dividends or capital gains, are reaped during the year. That timing is all
appropriately part of the ror calculation.
25

The survey results are available here:

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=afIqiSrR2HUY.
26

FY 2004 runs from July 2003 to June 2004 and is the most recent year for which we have

Form 990 data (from the 2003 SOI file). It is also the earliest year for which we could find
reported endowment returns. The NACUBO survey is available from earlier years, but
university-level endowment returns are not reported, only university-level endowment size and
aggregate summary statistics of rates of return.
27

We are more confident that they report honestly on the required form to the IRS than to

Bloomberg.
28

Most universities and only some nonprofits release financial reports that may indicate the

return on the endowment, but these are not coded into the dataset. We met with employees of
Harvard University's Office of the Controller (formerly Office of Financial Services) to
determine, for Harvard at least, if endowment information can be separately identified using only
the 990 information. They indicated that this was not the case.
29

These results are before the 2008 financial crisis, where large university endowments are

widely perceived to have done even more poorly than the hard-hit market average.
30

Operating funds are usually small but not insubstantial relative to the endowment. At Harvard

University, for example, the general operating account was about 18% of the value of the
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endowment at the end of both the 2006 and 2007 fiscal years, according to its financial report.
During the financial crisis Harvard was criticized for investing much too much of its operating
funds in its endowment (Healy 2009).
31

We would like to compare apples to apples – what does nonprofit A earn on its endowment

and what does nonprofit B earn on its endowment. Consider a situation where A has an
operating budget that is just 1% of its endowment, and B has one that is 50% of its endowment.
Suppose A earns 12% on its endowment and 4% on its operating budget; B earns 13% on its
endowment and 5% on its operating budget. Though B is earning higher returns, a calculation
like ours that cannot differentiate an endowment will show A earning a higher return.
32

We thank Larry Summers for suggesting this test. Note that if charities overreport ending

values for their endowments in a year, that will overestimate returns for that year and
underestimate it for the following year, tending to produce a negative correlation between odd
and even numbered years.
33

Note, there is a bias to underestimate this correlation given that end-of-year values are not

reported precisely. Then an overstated value for year one, will lead to greater than true reported
returns in year one and less than true reported returns in year two. Hence the correlation between
odd and even years will be biased negatively.
34

The exception is Crime- and Legal-Related nonprofits.

35

The size of this tax preference is uncertain, since the exemption of nonprofit income from

taxation is not classified as a tax expenditure by the Joint Committee on Taxation (Joint
Committee on Taxation, 2008, p. 42).

